RESPONSE

POOR PITIFUL OR POTENTLY POWERFUL PREFERRED?

LEO E. STRINE, JR.†
In response to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of
Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815 (2013).
Every policy proposal raises two questions. The first is whether there is
a problem that requires a solution. The second is whether the proposed
solution has more benefits than costs.
Because I am a judge, not a professor, my comments on Professors Bratton
and Wachter’s thoughtful Article1 will be questioning rather than conclusory.
Bratton and Wachter claim that the law lacks an adequate theory about
preferred stockholders.2 Specifically, they argue that this is problematic for
society because preferred stockholders are deprived of the benefit of their
bargain, a result that may imperil society as a whole because it undermines
the ability of corporations to raise the capital needed for long-term investment.3
The solution to this problem is for corporate law to impose on directors
the duty to protect the bargained-for expectations of preferred stockholders
by somehow identifying the extra value—the lagniappe in more savory
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1 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
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2 Id. at 1817.
3 See id. at 1822.
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terms—that preferred stockholders should receive over common stockholders.
These bargained-for expectations are, interestingly, not in the written
contract. Rather, they constitute some noncontractual expectation that
should be enforced, not as a matter of contract law, but because preferred
stockholders should be seen as some form of specially entitled stockholders
who have extra rights that, although not existing in the detailed contracts
they negotiate with issuers, should be identified and enforced by courts in
equity.4 Equally interesting, Professors Bratton and Wachter admit that the
extra rights can be and are frequently secured by preferred stockholders in
their contracts, but they also contend that it is preferable to have courts
enforce them as a matter of judge-made equity law than to require preferred
stockholders to secure them in the contracts themselves.5 The premise
seems to be that after-the-fact litigation presents less of an efficiency drag
and fairness problem than requiring preferred stockholders to secure their
“preferences” in contract, and otherwise assuming that they will be treated
no better and no worse than common stockholders.6
Not only that, when preferred stockholders wield control of the corporation, they can cause the sale of the corporation whenever they wish to cash
out; even if the corporation is solvent, there are plausible growth scenarios
in which the corporation could succeed and the sale will yield no proceeds
to the common stockholders.7 Put simply, if someone buys preferred stock
in an early-stage company that is developing a potentially very valuable but
also potentially worthless technology, at a discount to the liquidation
preference payable in the event of a merger, and that preferred stock has
4
5

See, e.g., id. at 1841; id. at 1872-74; id. at 1900.
See, e.g., id. at 1835 (“Under the corporate paradigm, the court entertains the fiduciary
claim—a decision that requires articulating a standard of review. Under the contract paradigm, the
court withholds fiduciary scrutiny on the ground that the preferred could have contracted for
protection.”); id. at 1839 (“Preferred stock arguably differs [from the common] because its
preferences are contracted for and presumably can be protected with explicit provisions.”); id. at
1841 (“A penalty default [against the preferred] . . . makes theoretical sense. It does not necessarily
follow, however, that it makes cost sense in the real world, even to a common stockholder.”); id. at
1847 (“In downside patterns, where the preferred’s market value is below its liquidation value, the
holders have a right to liquidation value in a merger only if the charter explicitly so provides.”).
6 See, e.g., id. at 1858 (asserting that preferred stock contracts “make no business sense” if
there is no judicial scrutiny, and suggesting that they be subjected to good faith review, with the
burden on the board); id. at 1890-91 (rejecting as “superficial” the response that preferred
stockholders who are “averse to litigation risk” can protect themselves by drafting their contracts
carefully).
7 See generally id. at 1851, 1883 (criticizing the court’s decisions in Equity-Linked Investors, L.P.
v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997), and In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, No. 1512-CC,
2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009)).
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board control rights, Bratton and Wachter say that the preferred stockholder
may cause the corporation to be sold at fair market value, recover its
liquidation preference, and leave the common with nothing, even if the
company has two years of cash left to pay its bills and all of its common
stockholders were sold stock on the basis that the company was a risky
startup, steadfastly determined to see if the technology would pan out.8
After the purchase of control by a preferred stockholder and the preferred
controller’s dominance of the board, the only fiduciary duty inquiry is to
determine whether the sale was at fair market value—there is no duty to
consider the interests of the common in seeing the risk that was the company’s
touted strategy to hazard actually taken.9 So long as there is a market-based
sale, the preferred can simply use its control of the board to secure its own
desire for immediate payment, as if it were a creditor with a contractual right
to demand repayment of its loan.
Having outlined Bratton and Wachter’s thesis, I now return to my first
question: Is there a problem? As an initial matter, I question whether preferred stock is undertheorized. The prevailing theory is simple: preferred
stockholders are preferred to the extent that they secure preferences (i.e.,
additional rights that may have economic value) in their contract.10 To the
extent preferred stockholders fail to extract contractual preferences, they are

8 See id at 1886.
9 See id.
10 Chancellor Allen

articulated this idea in Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.:

Thus, with respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that distinguish
preferred stock from common, the duty of the corporation and its directors is essentially contractual and the scope of the duty is appropriately defined by reference to
the specific words evidencing that contract; where however the right asserted is not
to a preference as against the common stock but rather a right shared equally with
the common, the existence of such right and the scope of the correlative duty may be
measured by equitable as well as legal standards.
509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986). Jedwab restates a long-held view of preferred stockholder
rights. See, e.g., Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co., 146 A. 337, 339 (Del. Ch. 1929) (“The holder of
preferred stock must therefore refer to the appropriate language of the corporate contract for the
ascertainment of his rights. . . . The statute . . . must be taken to mean that unless the preferences are stated in the certificate of incorporation, they shall not exist.”). This principle was
confirmed by Richard Buxbaum who showed how the drafters of company charters could grant
preferred stockholders rights that they would otherwise not have by statute. Richard M. Buxbaum,
Preferred Stock—Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 243-57 (1954) (discussing, for
example, how corporate drafters may, by contract, confer dividend rights upon preferred stockholders). The same view still holds true. See, e.g., Matulich v. Aegis Commc’ns Grp., 942 A.2d 596,
600 (Del. 2008) (“[T]he special rights and limitations of preferred stock are created by the
corporate charter or a certificate of designation . . . [and] are primarily contractual in nature.”).
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entitled to no better treatment than other stockholders.11 As preference
holders, preferred stockholders are owed the duty the corporation owes to
other contractual claimants, which is to honor their legal rights. Preferred
stockholders are owed fiduciary duties by the board only insofar as they are
like other stockholders. Thus, because preferred stockholders, like common
stockholders, desire value from the company’s performance, they may bring
derivative suits if they suspect directors are self-dealing. Similarly, if the
corporation is being sold, the preferred may bring a Revlon claim if they
believe the board is not honoring its duty to maximize the sale value of the
corporation.12 But, the board owes no fiduciary duty to maximize the value
of the preferred or to favor in any way the preferred over the common,
except when contractually required. In fact, the law suggests that when push
comes to shove, the board has a duty to prefer the common’s interests, as
pure equity holders, over any desire of the preferred for better treatment
based on some generalized expectancy that they will receive special treatment beyond their contractual rights.13 Indeed, if the preferred stockholders
actually secure control of the board, they are then expected to fulfill this
fiduciary responsibility and to refrain from using their power selfishly to
extract a return of their own investment, unless they do so on terms that are
shown to be fair to the common.14
11 See Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Constr. Co., 151 A. 228, 234 (Del. Ch. 1930) (“The
general rule is that preferred stock enjoys only those preferences which are specifically defined and
that as to all matters lying outside the field of defined preferences, preferred stock has no rights
which are not shared equally with the common stock.”), modified by 155 A. 514 (Del. 1931); Rice &
Hutchins, Inc. v. Triplex Shoe Co., 147 A. 317, 320 (Del. Ch. 1929) (“The preferred was simply
called such; any description of preferences, however, was omitted. The word ‘preferred’ therefore
meant nothing.”), aff ’d, 152 A. 342 (Del. 1930).
12 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (holding
that when a company puts itself up for sale, the “duty of the board . . . change[s] from the
preservation of [the company] as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at
a sale for the stockholders’ benefit”).
13 See Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating
that “generally it will be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to
prefer the interests of common stock . . . to the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock, where there is a conflict”).
14 See Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 658 (Del. Ch. 1975) (declaring
that while “one purpose of allowing the preferred to elect a majority of the board may be to bring
about a payment of the dividend delinquencies as soon as possible, . . . a preference board . . .
in control [must also] . . . serve[] the corporation itself and the common shareholders”); see also In
re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009)
(asserting that a “director is interested . . . if ‘he or she will receive a personal financial benefit
from a transaction that is not equally shared by the stockholders’” (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634
A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993))).
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Second, there are reasons to doubt that preferred stockholders lack sufficient market clout to protect their interests at the negotiating table. Preferred stockholders are not obviously the “poor pitiful preferred” that
Bratton and Wachter describe. That proposition makes little intuitive sense.
No one has to buy preferred stock. Those who do are quite sophisticated.
Preferred stock issuances often involve provisions such as: (1) a requirement
for a class vote on any issues affecting the preferred, including any merger,
asset sale, charter change, or issuance of more preferred shares, and (2) a
liquidation preference in the event of merger.15 In fact, Bratton and
Wachter’s own research reveals that half of the new issuances of preferred
since 2009 give the preferred effective approval rights over mergers.16
Although I am not sure what the authors consider “effective” protection, an
earlier study of preferred contractual rights concluded that about eighty-one
percent of preferred stockholders had negative covenants relating to
business combinations.17 And the common feature of a class vote solves
most of the problems Bratton and Wachter raise in their Article. Instead of
viewing the absence of such a common provision as an indication that a
particular preferred stock issue has no extra holdup value and is therefore
subject to no better treatment than the common, Bratton and Wachter fill a
gap that they have little evidence to claim is a gap, rather than an intentional
contract omission. Although the authors fear that common contractual
provisions giving preferred stockholders the ability to protect themselves in
a merger, default, or other event endangering their investment will result in
“holdups” (i.e., where preferred stockholders use their ability to vote as a
class to impede valuable corporate transactions),18 they ignore the fact that
such provisions are common and bargained for by issuers. Therefore, the
15 For example, one study revealed that eighty-one percent of investment contracts involved
provisions that required preferred approval of business combinations, ninety-one percent involved
provisions allowing the preferred to block adverse charter amendments, seventy-one percent
involved restrictions on redemptions of common stock or payments of common stock dividends,
and eighty percent involved restrictions on issuing more preferred stock. See D. Gordon Smith,
The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 346 (2005); see also Steven N. Kaplan &
Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture
Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 289, 291 (2003) (finding that venture capitalists
negotiate, for example, optional redemption and put provisions in seventy-nine percent of cases);
id. at 288, 290 (finding provisions granting additional voting rights if the target does not meet
financial milestones in eighteen percent of cases); id. at 289, 292 (finding anti-dilution provisions
in ninety-five percent of cases).
16 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1841 (“Fifty percent of the certificates provided for
merger class votes . . . while the other 50% left the preferred unprotected.”).
17 Smith, supra note 15, at 346.
18 See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1842 (“Class votes give preferred the ability to
hold up a merger in moderate distress situations.”).
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common stockholders have no just reason to complain about them (assuming
the preferred was issued for proper corporate purposes), and such provisions give the real parties an incentive to reach a mutually acceptable
compromise.
The proposition that, instead of extracting these specific contractual
rights and risking holdup by the real parties in interest, the preferred should
be able to look to judges to give them “noncontractual contractual” rights as
a matter of equity, rests on the idea that litigation about a nebulous proposition is more efficient than a mutually bargained-for contract. By way of
example, in their discussion of SV Investment Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks,
Inc.,19 Bratton and Wachter arguably overstate the extent to which courts,
rather than statutory corporate law itself, should affect the ability of preferred stockholders to get full redemption when the issuer does not have the
funds statutorily required for it to do so.20 To them, the court “strip[ped]
away a promise’s contractual vitality by remitting the decision to perform
the promise to pay to the discretion of the issuer’s board, thereby subordinating the preferred’s payment rights not only to the interests of the issuer’s
creditors, but to those of its common stockholders.”21 The court was supposedly biased against the preferred in accepting the issuer’s position that
there were no legally available funds unless the issuer had cash on hand (or
the equivalent).22
This reading is strained for a couple of reasons. First, the preferred
stockholders’ right to mandatory redemption in the defendant’s charter was
governed by language saying that the preferred “shall be entitled . . . to
redeem [their stock] for cash out of any funds legally available therefor.”23
This language presupposes that the corporation must have cash on hand
before making any redemption. But, as the trial court in ThoughtWorks found,
the plaintiffs’ own expert had “no thoughts” as to how the corporation
might obtain the cash to finance a redemption, even though the size of the
proposed redemption was approximately equal to the low end of the
expert’s estimate of the corporation’s equity.24 Furthermore, the corporation
19
20
21
22

7 A.3d 973 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff ’d, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011).
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1847-55.
Id. at 1860.
See id. at 1868 (“The reference to board process displaces the contract paradigm and restates
the issue in corporate terms: the question is no longer, ‘Can the issuer pay?’ but, ‘Did the issuer’s
board do an adequate job of justifying its decision not to pay?’”).
23 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 978 (emphasis added).
24 Id. at 989. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the case on these grounds. See SV Inv.
Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 37 A.3d 205, 211-12 (Del. 2011) (“Because the Vice Chancellor
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in ThoughtWorks had volatile cash flows, and management took care to “keep
some funds on hand so that checks [didn’t] bounce during a dry spell.”25
Because the plaintiffs introduced no evidence to show that the corporation
could raise the funds for the redemption, and it was undisputed that the
corporation needed to keep a cash cushion to operate as a going concern,
Bratton and Wachter seem to be overstating the leeway ThoughtWorks
grants the board by claiming that the court left the promise to redeem the
preferred “to the promisor’s discretion.”26
More importantly, Bratton and Wachter slight as ironic27 the fact that
ThoughtWorks cited a standard usually articulated by Delaware courts when
upholding the redemption payments to the preferred against challenges by
the common.28 In these cases, the plaintiffs claimed that the boards of their
respective companies acted outside their authority in determining that the
corporation had the required legal funds to pay the preferred.29 In rejecting
those challenges and ruling for the preferred stockholders, the Delaware
courts afforded reasonable deference to the boards in determining whether
funds were available, and held that a board’s determination of available
funds would not be set aside unless “the board acted in bad faith, relied on
methods and data that were unreliable, or made a determination so far off
the mark as to constitute actual or constructive fraud.”30 There is nothing
ironic about using that same standard to uphold a board’s decision not to
make a payment to the preferred; it is simply evenhanded. Thus, ThoughtWorks
was not, in the authors’ words, “tak[ing] a giant step away from contract
into corporate territory.”31

determined that SVIP had failed to prove its case even under its own definition of ‘legally
available funds,’ we need not reach or address the issue of whether SVIP’s definition is legally
correct.”).
25 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 977.
26 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1868 (describing the promise as “not meaningful”).
27 See id. at 1868 (“It is ironic, to say the least, to see a standard intended to facilitate payments
to stockholders redeployed to protect a board wishing to duck a contractually undertaken stockholder
payment.”).
28 See ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 988 (citing Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 702 A.2d
150, 156 (Del. 1997), and Morris v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 63 A.2d 577, 584-85 (Del. Ch.
1949)).
29 See Klang, 702 A.2d at 152 (“Plaintiff in this purported class action alleges that a corporation’s repurchase of shares violated the statutory prohibition against the impairment of capital.”);
Morris, 63 A.2d at 578 (“Plaintiff seeks . . . to prevent the defendant corporation from paying
dividends declared on certain classes of its preferred stock on the ground that such action would
violate the General Corporation Law of Delaware.”).
30 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 988 (citing Klang, 702 A.2d at 156, and Morris, 63 A.2d at 584-85).
31 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1868.
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Relatedly, even if redemption of preferred stock is made difficult when
there is a bona fide question as to whether the company’s creditors, who are
senior in priority, will get paid, Bratton and Wachter do little to show why
this is a problem. The preferred stockholders have many options to be
treated as pure creditors without having to straddle the equity–debt line.
Instead of investing in stock with contractual rights, they could choose to
invest with secured debt, subordinated debt, unsecured high-yield debt,
mezzanine debt, or convertible debt, among other financial products. The
provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law that prevents a
corporation from redeeming its stock when such a redemption would impair
the capital of the corporation is designed to protect the superior interests of
creditors from being injured at the hands of the equity investors, just as
liquidation preferences protect preferred stockholders over the common.32
It is therefore odd that preferred stockholders might champion a redemption
of their class of equity when doing so risks creditors’ ability to be repaid. The
reality is that all Bratton and Wachter have shown is that the law is careful
to make sure that a preferred stockholder is not paid his mandatory redemption unless the corporation has sufficient funds to pay more senior claimants. This is not a problem of contracting. It is the bargain the preferred
make.
Finally, Bratton and Wachter seem troubled that preferred stockholders
win very few litigated cases.33 I do not have the training or resources to
conduct a historical study of whether that is true, but even if it is, it does
not necessarily prove their point. Even if Bratton and Wachter tallied the
win–loss record—and they have not—that record may be affected by an
overwhelming tendency of issuers to honor, not violate, the contractual
rights of the preferred. The cases Bratton and Wachter cite are largely ones
in which the preferred were asking courts to give them extra value, which
they could have rooted in a written contract, but did not.34 The refusal of
32 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a) (2012) (stating that no corporation shall “purchase or
redeem its own shares of capital stock for cash or other property when the capital of the corporation is impaired or when such purchase or redemption would cause any impairment of the capital
of the corporation”).
33 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1901 (“The court’s disposition to favor the common
is unsurprising . . . . Senior security holders, conversely, have historically fared badly in the
Delaware courts . . . .”).
34 For example, in LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, the court, in refusing the preferred
stockholders’ request to enjoin a transaction on the basis that the board did not allocate more of
the merger consideration to the preferred than they would have received if they had converted to
common (i.e., the merger agreement treated them equal to the common based on the conversion
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courts to make up noncontractual contractual rights is not a reality that
immediately suggests a problem. Indeed, it tends to suggest a rightful
application of judicial discipline. The authors acknowledge this, claiming
that “the preferred almost always lose[] and for a good reason: . . . [they]
could have been protected at the drafting stage.”35 But in any case, they admit
that courts have in fact ruled for the preferred many times,36 and in the
brief period allotted to prepare this Response, it was not hard to find
additional examples they failed to cite.37
*

*

*

And what of Bratton and Wachter’s solution? In the context of mergers,
the authors suggest that the preferred stockholders should have the protections of at least one director, who will be charged with vindicating their
noncontractual contractual interests.38 This is curious, because one of the
traditional concerns of many corporate law scholars and economists has
been whether an effective accountability system for boards can be maintained
if the ultimate duty that the board owes to its stockholders is too diffuse.39
ratio), noted that the preferred did not negotiate for veto rights over a merger and the board did
not violate any of the preferred’s other extensive contractual rights. 990 A.2d 435, 438, 449 (Del.
Ch. 2010). Under such circumstances, the court concluded that the board “need not go further and
extend some unspecified fiduciary beneficence on the preferred at the expense of the common.” Id.
at 449.
35 William H. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock 1 n.1 (Nov. 9, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (emphasis
added).
36 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1901-02 n.388 (citing cases where the preferred prevailed on their claims in Delaware).
37 See, e.g., Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 152 (Del. 1997) (affirming
a lower court judgment in favor of the preferred because there were “no impairment of capital” or
“disclosure violations” during the course of a merger); Hokanson v. Petty, No. 3438-VCS, 2008
WL 5169633, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2008) (rejecting a claim that the board, which included
preferred stockholders, breached its fiduciary obligations to the common stockholders “by not
negotiating for a higher buyout price”); Cannon v. Denver Tramway Corp., 373 A.2d 580, 581, 583
(Del. Ch. 1977) (ordering, contrary to the claims of the common stockholders, a trustee in
dissolution to distribute remaining corporate funds proportionately to all stockholders including
the preferred); Morris v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 63 A.2d 577, 578, 585 (Del. Ch. 1949)
(denying a preliminary injunction to prevent a corporation from paying dividends to certain
classes of preferred stockholders).
38 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1857 (“[T]he independent committee should include at
least one director charged with representing the interests of the preferred.”).
39 The classic articulation of this view was made by Adolf Berle in 1932. See A. A. Berle, Jr.,
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367-68 (1932); see also,
e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 20 (1986) (“A single objective goal like profit maximization is more easily monitored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasonable
accommodation of all affected interests . . . . Assuming shareholders have some control mechanisms,
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Even when it is clear that the board’s goal must be to pursue profit for the
common stockholders within the limits of the law, there is room for debate
about the proper means and whether the board’s alleged focus on value for
the stockholders is pretextual and a guise for pursuing other ends.40 Bratton
and Wachter would complicate this clear understanding of the board’s end.
And, as a practical matter, they do not explain how the directors are to
fulfill their new duty.41
Why is this omission important to the workability of their policy proposal? Well, if preferred stockholders had a contractual right to a certain
better monitoring means that corporate managers will be kept more accountable. They are more
likely to do what they are supposed to do and do it efficiently.” (footnote omitted)).
40 See Berle, supra note 39, at 1367; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Anton Phillips Oration: The Logical,
But Often Overlooked, Consequences of Corporate Governance Reform and Prior Judicial
Decisions for Current Corporate Law Litigation 1-3 (Nov. 4, 2011) (discussing directors’ authority
and the important safeguards on it under Delaware law).
41 The authors suggest that one way a board can satisfy this duty to defend the extra noncontractual contractual value due to the preferred is to guarantee that the preferred get at least the
premerger market price for their shares. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1857. This has an
attractive facial tangibility. However, if the preexisting market price of the preferred is in fact
related to actual contractual guarantees—such as a higher entitlement to share in the corporation’s
cash flows through a dividend preference or better treatment in a merger through a liquidation
preference—then reference to the price will not be necessary because the contract will solve the
problem itself. If, by contrast, there is no rational reason why the preferred is trading at a premium
over the common other than the market’s own perception of the lagniappe that will be given by
courts for the noncontractual contractual value that supposedly comes with the name “preferred,”
the market price does not aid the board in any real way. Although it is difficult to gauge, it is likely
that most preferred stock does not trade on a recognized market. In that respect, it is also
uncertain how often there will be a reliable trading value for the preferred; in the cases on which
the authors focus, the preferred shares seem to be privately held and not widely traded. For
example, the preferred stock was not publicly traded in LC Capital Master Fund, LTD. v. James, 990
A.2d 435 (Del. Ch. 2010), a decision the authors criticize. See QuadraMed Corp., Preliminary Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A) 3 ( Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1018833/000119312510000575/dprem14a.htm (stating that, in the event of an unsuccessful merger of
the company in James, the common shares will continue to be traded on the NASDAQ, while the
preferred will “remain issued and outstanding”). As a result, the market price tether that Bratton
and Wachter suggest should limit the board’s duty would have been of little use in James. Even so,
it would be surprising if the authors found the market price for preferred shares reliable, given
their doubts about the reliability of share prices for widely held and liquid common shares of
corporations. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 723 (2010) (stating, with respect to the 2008 financial crisis,
that “[a]t least in retrospect we know that the market underestimated the risk being taken and thus
failed to provide an objective, critical reference point for monitoring purposes”); see also Robert
W. Holthausen & Mark E. Zmijewski, Pitfalls in Levering and Unlevering Beta and Cost of Capital
Estimates in DCF Valuations, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2012, at 60, 67-69 (discussing
substantial valuation errors that result from the common practice of assuming that the betas of
securities like preferred stock are equal to zero).
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degree of extra value, there would be no need for a special director, and the
corporation would just be obliged to honor those contractual rights. To
assign a director to bargain for the preferred stockholders on the basis that
they deserve some value, different from the value of the common stock into
which their shares could convert, is to have that director bargain for something indeterminate. Once the focus on the specific terms of the preferred
stock is rejected, Bratton and Wachter do not explain in detail how to
quantify the extra noncontractual expectancy value. No obvious methodology
comes to my mind.42 To this point, I note the absence of any clear way for a
special committee to value a control premium in a merger where a controlling stockholder with actual voting control seeks extra compensation for
that control, as the law putatively permits.43 Thus, the noncontractual
contractual value that the special committee should seek to protect becomes
a matter largely influenced by judicial decisionmaking about the lagniappe
that the preferred deserve in particular contests—decisionmaking untethered to any clear interpretive or valuation techniques.
Even with this gap in their proposal, I think it is fair to say that Bratton
and Wachter advocate a litigious, fact-intensive solution to the problems
they perceive. The authors propose various new standards of review, some
of which place the burden of persuasion on the defendant, thereby making
all motions to dismiss almost impossible.44 Thus, cases will require discovery

42 Because the value of the cash flows realizable from preferred shares will depend on the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of various scenarios in which the preferred may have different rights
from and special entitlements over the common, distinguished scholars have pointed out the
difficulty of valuing preferred shares. See Paul Glasserman & Zhenyu Wang, Valuing the Treasury’s
Capital Assistance Program, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1195, 1196-98 (2011) (noting the complexity in valuing
TARP preferred shares that have cash flow outcomes based on decisions the issuer and holder may
make); see also David Emanuel, A Theoretical Model for Valuing Preferred Stock, 38 J. FIN. 1133, 113739, 1149 (1983) (developing a valuation technique for preferred stock that pays dividends based on
available funds and noting the limitations of such a technique).
43 In In re Tele-Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the controlling stockholder demanded
and received, from a third-party acquirer, ten percent more for his shares (a control premium)
than the minority stockholders received for their shares. No. Civ.A. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at
*1-2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2006). The Court of Chancery suggested that in such a case, an investment
bank should deliver an opinion that the lower amount per share received by the minority was fair.
Id. at *13. Commentators reacted with concern, noting that there was no recognized corporate
finance theory an investment bank could apply to give such an opinion. See, e.g., Kevin Miller,
Delaware Court’s Criticism of Special Committee in TCI Merger Provides Important Guidance But May
Not Be Entirely Fair, M&A LAW., Feb. 2006, at 1, 4 (noting that many financial advisors believe
that relative fairness opinions and their inherent normative judgments “are beyond the scope of a
professional opinion, particularly an opinion expressed ‘from a financial point of view’”).
44 See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1833 (encouraging the placement of a burden
of proof on the board of directors).
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and will accrue holdup value. As a result, most cases will be expensive to
resolve if tried.
As a judge, I suppose I should feel complimented that Bratton and
Wachter regard the after-the-fact resolution of disputes by the judiciary as
more efficient than honoring the before-the-fact specific written bargain
between the sophisticated parties who entered preferred stock contracts.
But I am perhaps more aware than most of how different an adjudication is
from a creator’s determination of ultimate truth. Judges do the best we can,
trying in good faith to determine what happened and why from a record
based on after-the-fact testimony about past events by witnesses who often
have a bias. Many of us struggle to recall what we had for dinner last
Thursday, much less what was said during that dinner, and two people
without a reason to misremember will often recount a recent conversation in
materially different ways. Adding to this inherent potential for error is the
same factor that would afflict special committee members charged with
bargaining on behalf of preferred stockholders, and which would make the
judicial task an adventure in indeterminacy: once the inquiry is not whether
the preferred’s contractual rights have been honored, but whether the
preferred’s extra noncontractual expectancy has been honored, no reliable
frame of analysis exists to guide judicial analysis. When we venture beyond
the contractually enforceable and into valuing the subjectively expected, but
not the contractually protected, we are on a speculative journey. Imposing
liability on the basis of such a space mission potentially creates more
fundamental unfairness than it prevents. And, of course, in many states,
juries decide these questions, not judges.
To me, the point that Bratton and Wachter make that has the most policy
force, if true, is that the law discourages innovation and, therefore, wealth
creation by being too begrudging toward preferred stockholders.45 Because
preferred stock is often the favorite vehicle of venture capital, Bratton and
Wachter contend that venture capitalists will be inhibited from investing
the optimal amount unless they can be assured that whenever they secure
board control, they can cash out whenever they want to, so long as they sell
the company for its fair market value.46 Rather than bargaining for a right
to mandatory redemption on a particular date or using high-yield debt as
their method of investing, venture capitalists should be able to secure board
45
46

See id. at 1885-90.
See id. at 1874 (“[A] court that inhibits [a redemption right’s] enforcement not only diminishes the utility of preferred, but also disables a productive mode of financing.”).
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control rights and use those rights to determine, in their sole economic
interest, when they want liquidity. Bratton and Wachter argue that this is
good for wealth creation because venture capitalists will be encouraged to
invest if they know that they, in essence, can act like a creditor when they
are in control, subject only to the duty to market the company so as to
secure a fair price.47
Bratton and Wachter apparently have a high degree of confidence in
markets and courts to determine the value of early-stage companies.48 Their
Article is replete with probability scenarios that highlight “problems” in
order to offer solutions that are mainly judicial in nature.49 But as a judge
who must conduct appraisal proceedings and often sees two “experts” of
“valuation science” with tenure at top universities come into court and
swear under oath that their views of the DCF value under the CAPM
model of the same established corporation with a sustained period of
earnings vary widely, I am far less certain than the authors that their
confidence in market-testing early-stage companies is well placed.
Venture-backed companies are the kind of companies that can become
wildly successful or fail entirely. Venture capitalists have often claimed that
they require strong contractual protections precisely because only a small
percentage of the companies that they fund will pan out.50 But, of course,
they are not the only ones who take risks. Many early-stage companies have
common stockholders who have made company-specific investments just as
real as those made by the preferred, although not always in purely monetary
ways. Employees work “on the come,” and even some suppliers do. And
some investors buy common stock. Many of these equity holders accept risk
on the promise that the company is going to do what it says and try to take
a risky technology or service idea and turn it into a viable profit generator.
Thus, it is not obvious that the authors’ proposal is the one most consistent with promoting innovation.51 Perseverance has been critical to the
47
48

See, e.g., id. at 1879-80.
I note that this contrasts with their greater realism about the market’s wisdom in assessing
the value of established companies. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 41.
49 See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1826-29.
50 See George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1029, 1034 (1992) (noting that one-third of venture capital-financed companies go bankrupt,
one-third “limp” along but are unable to go public, and one-third “succeed”).
51 Commentators have suggested that venture capitalists may be too narrowly focused on an
“IPO or bust” strategy. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 27-29 (2012) (arguing that, rather than pursuing an IPO, venture capitalists should
sometimes sell their investments to other investors in secondary markets because this exit strategy
can help avert a “premature exit that leaves money on the table”). Bratton and Wachter seem to
encourage the emphasis on the IPO with their proposed revisions to the law.
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success of many American companies. Bratton and Wachter would give
venture capitalists the right to act as lenders, to end a company’s pursuit of
good-faith risk-taking, and to leave others who took critical risks with
nothing. Although they cite no decisions in which any court has ever
required preferred stockholders in control to engage in casino-like gambling
and to pursue strategies without a bona fide potential for success that would
leave creditors at unfair risk, Bratton and Wachter slight the fact that many
early-stage companies cannot credibly project their future earnings because
they are at a stage of their existence when developing their technology and
products is a critical part of their business plan. Venture capitalists who buy
stock in such companies know that the common stockholders are taking a
big risk on whether that innovative design process will pan out, and those
venture capitalists have specific tools of contracting to protect themselves if
they want a firm date on which they can liquidate their investment.52 So,
when venture capitalists fail to get such contractual guarantees, the notion
that their interests as noncontractual contractual expectancy holders are
paramount and supersede any duty that the board of directors would
otherwise owe to the common seems to have as much potential to discourage
innovation and wealth creation as it does to encourage it. The need for
equity to protect the preferred’s noncontractual company-specific investments over those of the entrepreneurs, employees, and investors who buy

52 See, e.g., Hokanson v. Petty, No. 3438-VCS, 2008 WL 5169633, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10,
2008) (permitting the preferred stockholders to cash out the common stockholders based on an
amount determined by a buyout option, which was secured by the preferred stockholders in
contract and exercised during the time period negotiated by the preferred stockholders and the
board of directors). Some more common instruments that preferred stockholders use to protect
their investment include mandatory redemption provisions or automatic redemption dates, which
are akin to put options on their preferred shares, subject to the statutory requirement that a
corporation may not redeem its shares when the redemption “would cause any impairment of the
capital of the corporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a) (2012); see also Smith supra note 15
(citing other common instruments used by preferred to protect their investment, including
preferred approval of business combinations). And courts recognize that there is real value in
these contract rights. See, e.g., Shiftan v. Morgan Joseph Holdings, Inc., 57 A.3d 928, 941-42 (Del.
Ch. 2012) (holding that, in an appraisal action for preferred shares, the court must consider all
nonspeculative contractual rights, and, in the context of that case, the preferred stockholders’
“automatic redemption” must be included as part of their shares’ fair value). The authors cite the
sophisticated tools promoted by the National Venture Capital Association, but because they
misconstrue the holding of ThoughtWorks as “impl[ying] a duty on the board’s part to drag its feet
about paying the redemption price,” and because they overlook the cases discussed in this footnote,
I question if they also underestimate the effectiveness of these tools. Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 1, at 1893.
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common stock remains questionable to me, given the abundant evidence of
preferred stockholders’ ability to get specific contractual protections.
In sum, Bratton and Wachter seem to sense that preferred stockholders
should be able to have it all: the right to be equity when they wish to be,
creditors when they wish to be, and not to be required to spell out this
broad range of entitlements in their written contracts, but to simply have
courts recognize their superior claim to an expectancy. Given both the
proven ability of preferred stockholders to secure protections in writing and
the reality of who buys preferred stock, it is unclear why the law should
extend such a special solicitude to the preferred, as opposed to other
important corporate constituencies like labor and home communities.
*

*

*

The world is messy. When an early-stage company has two years of cash
on hand, there is no danger that its legal creditors will not be paid. It can
continue to develop the technology or product that inspired its creation,
and when that development has a bona fide chance to pan out in a way that
will generate substantial value, Bratton and Wachter say that a preferred
stockholder in control can simply call in its investment as if it were a
creditor, regardless of the adverse effect that has on the common stockholders,
and subject to the limited duty to market the company for sale in a competent way.
They say this in criticism of Trados, which suggests that a traditional
duty of loyalty toward the interest of the common must be observed and
that a preferred controller cannot disregard the best interests of the common in its effort to exit its investment.53 Thus, the common stockholders’
expectations can be dashed, and an obligation of fairness toward them
satisfied, if preferred stockholders market the company to fifteen buyers,
and no one can credibly say for sure that the idea at the heart of the company
will in fact pan out. The probabilities of the market protect the controller,
the controller collects its liquidation preference, and the common stockholders can have the satisfaction of knowing that the market is always right.
This is so even if the preferred stockholder bought its position at a discount
from a prior preferred holder. This result, for Bratton and Wachter, is
simply the hard cheese of capitalism.
A more conservative mind might question whether the simpler solution
is to remind preferred stockholders of the long-standing principles applicable

53

See id. at 1884-85.
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to them. To the extent the preferred get a contract right, they are preferred.
To the extent they do not, they are subject to the same risks as other
stockholders and entitled to no extra value or rights. To the extent the
preferred exercise contract rights, they have no duties to other stockholders
and are entitled to those rights. To the extent the preferred assume control
as fiduciaries, they owe the duties traditionally owed by the fiduciaries of
corporations, including the duty to consider the best interests of the
common stockholders in making decisions and, so long as the legal rights of
other constituencies are not hazarded improvidently, the duty to pursue
business strategies benefiting the common stockholders.
This well-understood incentive scheme has its own complications. But it
creates good incentives for parties with the powerful leverage of preferred
stockholders to get their rights where they should—in the contract. By
contrast, the authors’ thought-provoking proposals may promote uncertainty
and excess litigation costs, and hazard genuine unfairness by charging
boards and courts with a duty to discover and enforce “rights” for preferred
stockholders that they could have, but did not, obtain in their contracts.
Why, of all corporate constituencies, preferred stockholders should be so
entitled, is but one of the many fundamental questions that requires an
answer before the law moves away from its traditional approach.

